Ethics Executive Salary

Leg. auditor slams Opelousas' housing authority

“I’m having a hard time just digesting these figures,” says Joe Ann Tyler, who took over the troubled agency in November 2009, after Guillory — who'd been double dipping as the LHA’s top official — left the Opelousas agency. “It may have taken three or four years to get into this, and it may take us three or four years to get out of it.” As they did for Lafayette, the legislative auditors call into question the legality of Guillory serving as ED of both agencies, bringing down about $242,000 in salary and benefits . In Opelousas he used a housing rental unit as his office, auditors found, making it unavailable for rental. Particularly troubling for Guillory, who was ED in Opelousas from December 2005 until November 2009, is that he actually resigned in Aug. 1, 2009, but then entered into a consulting agreement with the Opelousas agency. According to the consulting contract, Guillory was to receive $55,000 per year for four years. When he resigned, Guillory was in the second year of a five-year contract; the contract included no provision for severance but did require a 45-day written notification to the board of the ED’s intention to terminate the contract (Guillory provided that written notice on June 11, 2009). The $43,867 payment is a violation of the Louisiana Ethics Code and may also be a violation of the state constitution because the contract did not call for severance, the auditors note: “Because Mr. Guillory contracted with his former agency within two years following his resignation, Mr. Guillory may have violated state law.” (It’s a similar post-employment provision that should have prevented consultant Greg Gachassin from working on low-income housing projects involving the Lafayette Public Trust Finance Authority after he left the board in late 2009; read “How Gachassin Games the System” here .) Particularly disturbing in the auditor's findings is the HACO’s defunct home-ownership program. The program was created in anticipation of receiving low-income housing tax credits from the Louisiana Housing Finance Agency, yet those tax credits were never awarded. The HACO borrowed $144,000 (through a bank line of credit rather than obtain Louisiana Bond Commission approval) to buy 10 acres of land from Daniel and Lisa Mistric Jr. and for other expenses related to the development. In total, the housing authority spent $213,744 on the failed project — $88,000 for the land, $52,409 in development costs and $73,335 to a consultant. The HACO contracted with Vital Communications to develop and publicize what was called a “Pilot Program for Homeownership,” paying it $73,335 in monthly installments from December 2006 to October 2009. An addendum to one of the two contracts with Vital indicates one was implemented retroactively, the auditors point out. Vital Communications, like Guillory, used a housing rental unit as its office — both times without HUD’s approval. was able to obtain on Vital Communications is that it is located at 708 Evergreen Lane in Opelousas and also has done business as La Bonne Vie LLC ; neither is registered with the Secretary of State. Its contact person is Tibberly G. Richard, whom state records indicate is director of the Louisiana Institute on Poverty Initiative and is president of the St. Landry Public Assistance Corp., two non-profits. Other key findings involved the HACO’s failed attempt to organize its own police force, buying five 2009 Dodge Chargers for $103,515 and spending another $127,558 for equipment. The state auditors also delved deeper into the band debacle uncovered by an independent audit of the agency, in which the HACO spent $88,000 to create a community band and another $36,495 on musical instruments and $3,800 on a bus. Again, none of these purchases or the contracts to hire band development program employees, who were paid $10-$30 per hour, was competitively bid. To date, 71 musical instruments remain missing from the defunct program.

Health Care Organizational Ethics: Insurance Executive ...

It was the kind of call Andrew Dreyfus expected. Hired as chief executive of Blue Cross last fall, Dreyfus has been championing affordability — prodding payers and providers to work together to rein in the price of medical care following years of double-digit insurance premium increases. Then came the uproar over millions of dollars collected by his predecessor, Cleve L. Killingsworth, and headlines about five-figure annual fees paid to board members. Suddenly, the talk about lowering health care costs rang hollow. When one group (clinicians) is charged with protecting fidelity, and another (insurers) is charged with protecting stewardship, human nature and group psychology inevitably leads to mutual suspicion. Clinicians can see insurers as "uncaring bean counters." Insurers can see clinicians as narcissists who feel entitled to spend other people's money in an unchecked manner. In the 1990s, these reactions ran amok, leading to the demise of managed care. Tension between those who are directly responsible for patient care and those who are directly responsible for stewardship of collective funds isn't peculiar to the United States. I observed the same tension in England between clinicians and the National Health Service. The tension arises from a classical good v good conflict. It is good to care about patients and to seek to do everything possible for them (fidelity). And it is good to care about containing health care costs so that individuals and society have the wherewithal to address other important areas of life (stewardship). As important as health care is, individuals and societies have other interests as well! For us to get a grip on health care costs, insurers - no matter whether they are private or public, for profit or not for profit - must be able to work collaboratively with clinicians. For this to happen, they have to be seen as understanding and caring about core clinical values. Appearance counts for a lot. An $11 million golden parachute to a departing CEO and high compensation for a board of directors will lead many clinicians and patients to see insurers as "uncaring bean counters" even if Albert Schweitzer or Mother Theresa is in charge of the organization! The issue is what sort of incentives the compensation creates. Executives attracted by the possibility of making millions are not likely to be good at stewardship in the sense you use the word.

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